Recall premise 1 of SA : that I don't know that I have two hands unless I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. Moore famously noted that this thought cuts both ways. One can just as well use it to argue that, since I do know that I have two hands, therefore I also know that I am not a brain in a vat. That is, they try to explain how one knows, in the typical case, that skeptical scenarios are false.
They are in the business of providing an account of knowledge that can explain and support a theoretical response to the skeptical argument under consideration. Moore by denying premise 2 of SA. Rather, one can be justified in believing that one has two hands, and even know that one does, on the basis of one's perceptual experience alone, without further evidence about one's perceptual conditions, the reliability of one's experience, the reliability of one's perceptual powers, or the like.
Having gained this sort of justification via perceptual experience, one can then go on to reason that various skeptical scenarios are false, mimicking Moore's reasoning above. Much of Pryor's approach is consistent with both internalist and externalist accounts of justification and knowledge. We said that S's belief that p is sensitive just in case it satisfies the following condition:.
If p were false, S would not believe that p. In the closest possible world where p is false, S does not believe that p. Ernest Sosa has argued that a belief is better safe than sensitive, where S's belief that p is safe just in case it satisfies the following condition:. S would believe that p only if p were true.
Here Sosa means to propose an alternative necessary condition on knowledge. Accordingly, we have:.
S knows that p only if: S would believe that p only if p were true. The intuitive idea here is that, in cases of knowledge, one could not easily have been wrong.neipredlandbric.ga
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Alternatively, not easily would S believe that p when p is false. There is some controversy over how to best capture this intuitive idea, however. First, we can distinguish between a strong and a weak reading of the subjunctive conditional in Safety. Strong Safety. S knows that p only if: In close possible worlds, always if S believes that p then p is true. In close possible worlds, never does S believe that p and p is false.
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Weak Safety. S knows that p only if: In close possible worlds, usually if S believes that p then p is true. In close possible worlds, almost never does S believe that p and p is false. Plausibly, Strong Safety does no better with the counterexamples raised against sensitivity theories in Part I. Notice, however, that the condition expressed in Strong Safety is also violated in those examples. For example, there is a close world where S believes that the rookie misses, but it is false that the rookie misses.
Since Sosa means to endorse a safety condition as an alternative to a sensitivity condition, it makes sense to interpret him as endorsing Weak Safety. Pritchard has recently argued for a position between Strong Safety and Weak Safety. The guiding idea is that knowledge is most threatened by error in the closest nearby worlds. Pritchard ties this idea to more general considerations about luck. In general, Pritchard argues, judgments about luck place more weight on those counterfactual events that are modally closest.
For example, suppose that a sniper fires two shots, the first of which misses your head by inches and the second of which misses by yards. Intuitively, you are luckier to be missed by the first shot than to be missed by the second. Put differently, you more easily could have been hit by the first shot than by the second. Pritchard's idea is that knowledge is intolerant of luck in a similar way, and that this is what the safety condition should capture.
Accordingly, Pritchard suggests the following:. S knows that p only if 1 in all close possible worlds, usually if S believes that p then p is true, and 2 in the closest possible worlds, always if S believes that p then p is true. We may now consider the safety theorist's approach to SA. That is, the strategy is to deny that I don't know that skeptical possibilities are false. First, consider my ordinary beliefs about the world, such as my belief that I have two hands. In normal environments, where no brains in vats or deceiving demons exist, many such beliefs will count as safe.
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For example, in normal environments where I believe that I have two hands, I would believe this only if it were true. But the same is true of my belief that I am not a handless brain in a vat. Since there are no close worlds where I am a handless brain in a vat, there are no close worlds where I believe that I am not but I am. The safety condition is satisfied. Assuming that remaining conditions on knowledge are satisfied as well, a safety theory allows that I know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. Similar considerations will apply to other skeptical scenarios.
Is it fair to assume that remaining conditions on knowledge are satisfied? An obvious worry is that, taken by itself, the safety condition is quite weak, and so it is no surprise that it is easily satisfied. One kind of case is especially relevant in this context; namely, those where S believes a proposition that is true in all close worlds, and therefore satisfies the safety condition by default. Suppose also that S forms a perceptual belief that the frog he sees is green and S has no other reason for believing that the frog is green.
Finally, suppose that frogs are by nature green, due to some feature of frog DNA. Accordingly, frogs are green in all nearby possible worlds. But S could not be easily wrong that the frog is green, since we are supposing this is a stable fact about a natural kind. S's belief that the frog is green is safe, but clearly S does not know that the frog is green.
What more is needed? Sosa argues that we must add a broader cognitive ability, one that gives rise to the safety of the particular belief in question. In general, knowledge is true safe belief grounded in a broader intellectual virtue or ability. But abilities in general are to be understood in modal terms.
To see the point, consider that one might have success in the actual world without ability. In short, one might be lucky.
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For example, I might successfully hit a baseball in the actual world, but only because, by good fortune, my bat is in the right place at the right time. Ability requires counterfactual success — one has ability only if one continues to hit the ball in worlds that are relevantly close.
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For example, in worlds where the ball comes in a little higher or a little faster, the player with ability adjusts her swing accordingly. But now the same applies to intellectual abilities. The person with excellent perception forms true beliefs and avoids false beliefs in the actual world, but continues to do so in relevantly close worlds. And that entails that a safety condition will be satisfied by her perceptual beliefs: In relevantly close worlds, if S perceptually believes that p then p is true. Recall that one of the advantages claimed for contextualism is that it explains the pull of skeptical considerations and the appeal of the skeptical arguments such as SA.
In particular, contextualism explains the appeal of premise 2 of SA , the claim that I do not know that I am not a handless brain in a vat. Sosa's explanation is that it is easy to confuse safety with sensitivity. Beliefs about skeptical possibilities are not sensitive. Knowledge requires safety.